[1999SP:34]

This question <34|34> overall <33|35> Martin: <33|51>.

Question 91: How does Marx's labor theory of value differ from an explanation of value by what today would be called the “disutility of labor,” i.e., the “sacrifice of ease, liberty, and happiness”?

[34] Martin: Marx sees labor which creates products of labor that serve as use values as “an immeasurably ancient relation valid in all forms of society” [Grundrisse] and as “man's normal life-activity” [this footnote].

I agree with HE's argument that for Marx “abstract labor” exists not just in capitalist, bourgeois society.

The passages in the Study Guide from the Contribution, and referring to the Grundrisse, help explain how Marx's analysis is a historical one, but in Capital, is mainly presented as a current one going into the essence of what a commodity is, what labor is, etc in a developed bourgeois society. The essence of this relationship although it existed in pre-capitalist societies only comes to be seen clearly as one of abstract labor in a capitalist society. Here commodity exchange is so dominant, that one form of labor readily takes the place of another, and the abstract nature of labor can be considered separate from its actual social forms.

I am not here answering question 92, which asks for specific comments on Adam Smith's views, which I do not feel sufficiently confident about. However the footnote suggests that these phrases about the sacrifice of rest, freedom and happiness, may occur to Adam Smith because of his superficial observation of the wretched nature of the laborers of his time. I wonder whether Marx intended that as a full criticism of this view, because laborers under a feudal system, or a slave system, would not often have much ease, freedom or happiness either. I myself wonder if the phrase was also typical of the thinking of an intellectual at the time of the rising bourgeoisie, who would regard work automatically as a loss of ease, rather than an opportunity to share collectively in the production of society's wealth, and to be respected for doing so. It is a rather individualist and subjective way of looking at labor, which has no connection with the fact that modern labor is a direct descendant of the life processes of early hominids in gaining use-values from nature.

To the extent that these phrases may be used in some form in modern capitalist economics they seem to point to a subjectivist theory of economics about pleasure deferred or pleasure satisfied, focussed on specific commodities or specific numbers of hours, but nothing about the organic relationship of humans as a community to their environment.

I have a problem that looking back on Marx's writing with the perspective of the late 20th century with its ideas of complexity theory, it seems to me to be blindingly obvious that (exchange)value is an “emergent property” of commodity exchange and becomes the dominant form qualitatively, once a quantitative stage of economic development is reached. I don't know if HE would comment here or later on whether this could be compatible with Marx's analysis or whether it undermines the dialectical nature of Marx's analysis.

However the question asks about the labor theory of value. My understanding is that Marx and Engels talked about the law of value, and Engels said this had lasted at least 7000 years, referring to some commodity exchange, between different communities, roughly on the basis of the socially necessary labor that went into the exchange value. The labor theory of value of the classical economists does not distinguish the change in this process with history, and there are some aspects of value that they did not see.

In the footnote here, Marx says that Adam Smith sometimes argues that equal quantities of labor always have the same value, whereas what is relevant is abstract labor, socially necessary labor. An inefficient worker, through laziness, ill health or backward tools, would not produce more value, Marx has pointed out, just because he/she sacrificed more “ease, liberty, and happiness.”

Hans: Hi Martin, thank you for your participation, but your answer to Question 91 was too long and complex for me. I give you here some nitpicking comments about the first half of it. I am not sending it to the list but it will show up in the archive of all submissions.

Marx sees labor which creates products of labor that serve as use values as “an immeasurably ancient relation valid in all forms of society” [Grundrisse] and as “man's normal life-activity” [this footnote].

“Labor which creates ... use values” is useful labor. I am not sure how one can call useful labor a relation. Of ccourse, production is only possible in a social context, i.e., there are social relations involved, but in many ancient societies these relation were direct relations between the producers and did not go through their labor. Only in capitalism do the producers generally relate to each other only through the products of labor.

I agree with HE's argument that for Marx “abstract labor” exists not just in capitalist, bourgeois society.

Thank you, but you say below that relations of production have always focused on abstract labor. This is not my view, and this is not what I meant when I said that abstract labor always existed.

In ancient times, relations of production did not come to be seen as relations of abstract labor because they weren't relations of abstract labor. In earlier societies, society was regulating concrete labors, not abstract labors. Social regulations saw to it that there were the right number of peasants and artisans, etc. The oldest son inherited the farm, the number of artisans in a city was tightly regulated, etc. This is all very concrete. Today society tells the producers: I don't care what you do, it is ok as long as you find someone who buys it, and you will be reimbursed for your labor input. This is regulation by abstract labor.